Communist Party of Australia

The Defence White Paper released at the beginning of May outlines the Rudd Labor government’s plans for a huge and relatively rapid build-up in Australia’s military capability like nothing seen since the Second World War. The nature of this massive increase in combat power, military infrastructure and personnel suggests that the government is preparing for participation in a major war. Military spending has been insulated from the tough budgetary measures being imposed on health, education, other vital social services and genuine environmental measures.

The military industry in Australia have welcomed the White Paper with open arms, trying to justify it with claims that it will act as a job-creating stimulus to the economy. The same billions spent on civilian projects would create many hundreds of thousands more jobs, would do less damage to the environment without the risk of the devastation that armed conflicts bring and be of huge benefit to the people.

The new acquisitions include three Air Warfare Destroyers equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles (range of 370 kilometres); eight new Future Frigates equipped to the teeth for long range submarine detection and operations; at least 24 new naval combat helicopters able to fire air-to-surface missiles; 46 new MRH90 helicopters equipped with infrared systems; 20 Offshore Combatant Vessels; a large strategic sealift ship to move stores, equipment and personnel; and six new heavy landing craft.

The focus is on raising Australia’s marine capability for off-shore offensive action. There are numerous other provisions to increase personnel, intelligence gathering and surveillance, integration of forces, and rationalisation of operations.

The defence budget is expected to increase from $20.3 billion last year to over $30 billion in nine years time. In addition the government expects the defence forces to make an additional $20 billion in internal efficiencies, which will also contribute to the cost of its build-up. It doesn’t take a degree in rocket science to identify the offensive nature of this build-up and what could be done instead with the same money in the social sphere and through foreign aid.

Foreign policy statement

The White Paper is much more than an outline of new major spending projects, it is in effect a foreign policy statement setting out Australia’s strategy up to 2030, with provision for regular five-yearly reviews.

The old “three pillar” policy that basically divides Australia’s areas of operations into national, regional and global is replaced by a set of four strategic interests and priority tasks. “Strategic interests are those national security interests that concern the structure and features of the international order that ensure our security from armed attack – and in relation to which Australia might contemplate the use of force. [emphasis added]

“Our most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct armed attack” and “the principal task is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on support or combat forces of other countries.” [emphasis is in White Paper] The offensive nature of the build-up and its focus on the capability to wage war from some distance offshore suggests the priorities of the White Paper lie elsewhere.

“Our next most important strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific Island states.” “From a strategic point of view, what matters most is that no major military power that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us.” [emphasis added] US bases in the neighbourhood, of course, are very welcome and supported.

The third most important strategic interest and task relates to the Asia-Pacific region and Australia’s contribution to “military contingencies” in the region. “To this end, we would be concerned about the emergence of a security environment dominated by any regional power, or powers, not committed to the same shared goals. It would be in our strategic interests in the decades ahead that no power in the Asia-Pacific region would be able to coerce or intimidate others in the region through the employment of force, or through the implied threat of force, without being deterred, checked or, if necessary, defeated by the political, economic, or military responses of others in the region.” [emphasis added]

The fourth strategic interest and tasks are global security and Australia’s preparedness to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

The treatment of these strategic issues reveals the preparedness of Australia to go to war, to intervene internally in civilian life and governance, interdict marine vessels, impose sanctions, and take other actions around the globe.

On the question of neighbourhood security, the paper specifically singles out Indonesia for special mention: “It is in Australia’s vital strategic interests to see a stable and cohesive Indonesia.” This raises the question: would the government “contemplate the use of force”, and take it upon itself to intervene if the situation there deteriorates? Are Australia’s interventions in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands pilots for future actions in the region?

US alliance

The US alliance remains central to Australia’s foreign policy and military strategy. Pine Gap and other US spy and military facilities remain as important as ever. “Australia and the United States will continue to look for ways to deepen our defence cooperation.

“Both countries are also committed to fostering cooperation in other areas, such as: strategic planning and wargaming; the harmonisation of capability requirements and interoperability; technology access and acquisition; combined operational planning; regional engagement cooperation; missile defence and space situation awareness…”

This increasing integration with the US military implies ongoing support for the political and military strategy and aims of the US administration.

“The United States will remain the most powerful and influential strategic actor over the period to 2030 – politically, economically and militarily. Its strategic primacy will assist in the maintenance of a stable global strategic environment.”

The likelihood of it retaining this position until 2030 is debatable; the US could emerge from the present global recession substantially weakened as an economic power and less influential by then.

Offensive first strike stance

The government makes the point that its strategy “does not necessarily entail a purely defensive or reactive approach… we will need to be prepared to undertake proactive combat operations against an adversary’s military bases and staging areas,….”

Australia is presented as a sheriff in its own right, a world leader taking initiatives to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and ready to assist with humanitarian and other assistance.

Australia seeks to “have greater strategic influence beyond our immediate neighbourhood … to exert policy influence that is underpinned by military power…” We are “a middle power which is active in promoting security. … Ultimately, our defence relationships are designed to underpin the possible use of military force.”

Changing world

“Australia’s strategic outlook over the coming decades will continue to be shaped by the changing global distribution of economic, political and military power, and by the future role and weight of the United States….

“We will … see changed strategic power relativities and an increasingly ‘multipolar’ global order, driven by changing patterns of underlying economic power and political influence.” References are made to China, India, Japan and Russia as strategic powers.

China

The Paper recognises that Australia is not under threat but says, “We have to consider the possibility of potentially adverse changes in our strategic outlook, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.”

It says, “we have a deep stake in the maintenance of an Asia-Pacific regional security environment that is conducive to the peaceful resolution of problems between regional countries and can absorb the rise in strategic and military power of emerging major players.” [emphasis added]

We need “to consider the circumstances of a more dramatic and, in defence planning terms, sudden deterioration in our strategic outlook. While currently unlikely, a transformation of major power relations in the Asia-Pacific region would have a profound effect on our strategic circumstances. Of particular concern would be any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilising force.”

Those are some of indirect references to China.

“China is critical to stability in Northeast Asia and the wider region…. China will be central to the development of a cooperative security community in the Asia-Pacific region. Closer to home, we need to engage China as a responsible stakeholder in support or our common desire to see stable, prosperous and well-governed nations in our immediate region.”

China’s military modernisation over the long term “could affect the strategic reach and global postures of the major powers”. It emphasises the need for the US to remain strategically engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Developing our defence relationship with China is therefore a priority.”

The growth of China and Russia raises the question of how the US expects to maintain its superiority beyond 2030 or even in the years leading up to that date.

The US, supported and assisted by Australia, has a multi-faceted approach. This includes fostering inter-ethnic conflicts, secessionary movements to break up the state, internal political interventions and war.

The nature of Australia’s build-up of military capability, in particular the focus on offshore marine operations and the importance it attaches to China, suggest Australia is preparing for war, and the target could be, but is certainly not exclusively, China.

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