- by Jo Dunleavy
- The Guardian
- Issue #2155
Temple of Confucius, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Photo: CEphoto, Uwe Aranas – wikimedia.org (CC BY-SA 3.0)
To understand why the Chinese remain so firm in their determination to oppose what they describe as a “small gang of splittists” it is only necessary to look at the past century or so of history of the island.
In April 1895, through an aggressive war against a weak imperial China, Japan forced the Chinese to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki and occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched its all-out war of conquest against China.
In December 1941, the Chinese nationalist government issued the Proclamation of China’s Declaration of War Against Japan, announcing that all treaties, agreements and contracts concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan.
In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the Chinese Nationalist, US and British governments, stipulating that Japan should return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese, including Northeast China, Taiwan, and the Penghu Archipelago.
The 1945 Potsdam Proclamation agreed by China, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union stipulated that: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.”
In August 1945, Japan surrendered and promised in its instrument of surrender that it would fulfil the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On 25 October 1945, China recovered Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago, resuming sovereignty over Taiwan.
However, between 1945 and 1949 the Chinese Nationalists of the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-Shek resumed their campaign, which had only been temporarily and very partially put on hold during the anti-Japanese war, against the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong.
On 28 February 1947, popular discontent against the KMT on the island boiled over into a mass uprising which was only put down by KMT forces after an estimated 20,000 people were killed.
On 1 October 1949, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed, replacing the Republic of China.
Chiang and the KMT remnants were forced to withdraw to Taiwan and its surrounding islands. The Kuomintang, remained in power in Taiwan, first under the dictator Chiang, then under his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee Teng-hu.
In 1991, Lee ended emergency rule, which had permitted the domination of Taiwan’s national assembly by mainland delegates appointed in 1947 by the KMT.
During the 1990s the anti-KMT opposition gained a number of seats in the assembly. In 1999 a split developed in the KMT when James Soong challenged the official candidate for the 2000 presidency, Vice President Lien Chan, and was expelled. The opposition candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the election, with Lien placed third behind Soong.
During the election, Chen had pledged that his Democratic Progressive Party would not push for separation from the mainland. Chen’s essential problem was that in pushing for international support for separation he was swimming against the tide.
For the two decades after the 1949 revolution, the socialist camp and many non-aligned nations strongly supported the PRC and many capitalist countries likewise began to recognise it, however reluctantly, the new reality in China, while the US maintained a solid position of support for its anti-communist ally in Taipei.
However, during the 1970s, as People’s China and the US established better relations, the Taiwanese regime became increasingly isolated.
In October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which kicked out the Taiwan authorities and gave China’s UN seat to the government of the PRC.
This was followed in September 1972, by a Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, with Japan recognising the government of the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, and promising to abide by Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.
In December 1978, China and the US issued a Joint Communiqué in which the US side recognised “the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China” and acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China”.
Today, despite the efforts to link diplomatic recognition with handsome trade and aid deals, Taiwan’s only full diplomatic status in Europe is with Vatican City. Its main embassies are in a dozen or so Central American and Caribbean states, a handful of African states and a sprinkling of tiny island states in the Pacific, such as Paulu and Tuvalu.
The former Yugoslav republic reverted to recognition of the PRC after a two-year spell in which it had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan after Taipei pledged up to US$300 million in cash and more than US$1 billion over a longer period.
Then, the South Pacific island state of Nauru broke relations with Taipei.
The Taipei administration continues to designate itself as the “Republic of China,” it maintains support for Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, as of course does the PRC, which causes considerable problems with many of its anti-PRC allies.
However, the Taiwanese also lay claim to sovereignty over the entirely independent Republic of Mongolia. Just as bizarrely, the Taiwanese claim that the Chinese mainland capital is still Nanjing and not Beijing.
Despite this, relations have indeed improved and have come a long way since the 1950s when both sides shelled each other’s territories and Chian occasionally launched commando raids on the mainland.
In 1979, Beijing launched a series of proposals, beginning with the National People’s Congress’s “Letter to Taiwan Compatriots,” which proposed the two sides should establish “Three Links” (trade, postal, and transportation) and “Four Exchanges” (economic, cultural, technological, and sports).
In response, the Taiwanese administration outlined the “Three Nos” policy (no contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise).
The People’s Republic’s position has been constant for the best part of two decades; a process of peaceful unification in which the PRC retains its goal of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” with the capitalist character of the Taiwanese economy remaining for “a long time to come.”
The “one country two systems” policy has already proven effective in Macau and Hong Kong, two former colonies that returned to Chinese sovereignty in the late 1990s. Despite the dire predictions of some in the West, neither territory shows signs of losing its unique character anytime soon.
The Taiwanese regimes have always been caught in a dilemma. Their claim to be the legal government of all of China and Mongolia has long been a fiction, their attempts at international recognition have run aground.
Even the very idea of “independence” illustrates the Alice-in-Wonderland fantasy of the Taiwanese separatists. After all, if the rightful sovereign government of all China is in Taiwan, the island would, in effect, be declaring independence from its own territory.
A less fantastic option and one that has been canvassed openly in the Taipei press over the past couple of years is that the Taiwan administration renounce its claims on Mongolia and the mainland and seek recognition as a new state. However, this is unlikely to be any more successful.
The obvious alternative is to make a serious response to Beijing’s proposals which would allow the Taiwanese to negotiate a large measure of real autonomy.
The PRC has stated clearly that it would not station troops or impose a PRC administration on the island. Economic realities are pushing the two sides together in any case. Total Taiwanese investment in the mainland over the past decade has been estimated at over US$40 billion.
Cultural and language ties make mainland China the obvious centre of attention for Taiwan’s hard-pressed corporations. The mainland has quite deliberately encouraged this both on pragmatic economic grounds and with the longer term aim of encouraging what used to be termed the “overseas patriotic bourgeoisie,” that is to say ethnic Chinese businesses outside the mainland willing to invest in China.
Taiwan had long developed profitable links with Hong Kong and Macau during their colonial periods. Now the colonial powers have gone and the trade ties remain but the territories’ status has changed to ‘Special.’
Without any major ethnic, language or cultural differences with their mainland compatriots and with growing trade and investment ties that will inevitably bring Taiwan under the wing of the mainland’s rapidly developing economy, the rational case for separatism can only grow weaker.
The last hope of the separatists is to count on backing from both the US, which has always seen Taiwan as a dagger pointed at the PRC, and Japan which is increasingly interested in developing itself as a regional power and wants to curb Chinese influence in East Asia. The Chinese government encourages peaceful and realistic dialogue in the direction of reunification of the Chinese people and their territory.
