- by Graham Holton
- The Guardian
- Issue #2177
The 2026 National Defense Strategy report, authored by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, redefines the United States’ role in the world, prioritising the Western Hemisphere as the forefront of its strategic concern. The US is signalling that the Americas, from Greenland to South America, are critical to its national security, stability, and political influence, with a renewed reliance on the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. The Middle East is no longer a primary theatre for the US grand strategy. Instead it is a managed risk zone. Imported Middle Eastern oil is no longer essential to national security, only to assure global price stability. Any disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies has limited impact on US oil demands.
The US will prioritise hemispheric security as integral to national security, blurring the lines between domestic and regional defence. The US is reasserting its pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, asserting no external military power will be tolerated if it undermines US influence in the region. Strategic objectives include energy integration, critical mineral cooperation, and reinforcing North American competitiveness.
Many governments in Latin America already view US political, economic and military pressure as reminiscent of historical interventionism, with this year seeing controversial military actions. Under operation Southern Spear, the US expanded its naval presence in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, deploying the largest US naval force in the region since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This huge naval buildup was to strike small vessels said to be linked to narcotics trafficking – without proof. It linked drug trafficking and “authoritarian rule” as a challenge to US regional dominance. Framed in terms of regional security imperatives, US forces kidnapped Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. The operation showed regime change and direct force are considered viable instruments for US strategic aims.
In bad news for Australians wanting to cling to the illusion that the United States is at all interested in an ‘international rules-based order,’ the Strategy calls that idea “a cloud castle abstraction.” Instead, it announces, the US will make agreements and alliances on a case-by-case basis in its own interests.
China is seen as a long-term strategic rival, rather than a cooperative partner, with the US wanting to counter Chinese influence across Latin America and the Caribbean. After 3 January, China and Russia are recalibrating their strategies in Latin America, with China reconsidering the depth of its engagement in the region.
The Strategy has a lot of bombast. Pages are devoted to scolding previous US administrations and praising Donald Trump’s “wise” and “courageous” policies.
Unsurprisingly, not all of the bombast is true. For example, Operation Rough Rider against Yemen’s Houthis which ended in the US withdrawing from the area after accidentally shooting down a US$67 million Super Hornet and dropping two more in the sea is described a massive success, compelling the Houthis to sue for peace. Hegseth doesn’t mention that the Houthis announced that the ceasefire didn’t preclude attacking Israel.
