- The Guardian
- Issue #2212
Photo: Petersod – wikimedia.org (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Statement from the Construction Forestry Mining and Engineering Union
At 11.50am on 15 October 1970, span 10-11 of Melbourne’s West Gate Bridge collapsed during construction, plunging 50 metres to the ground below. Thirty-five workers were killed. Eighteen others were injured.
Thirty-five men who went to work never came home. Families lost husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers. Workmates carried grief that would last a lifetime.
The Royal Commission exposed grave failures in design, construction, supervision and communication. It described the disaster as “utterly unnecessary.”
For the CFMEU, those words carry an enduring obligation. These workers’ deaths must never become just another chapter in construction history. Their memory demands action.
Safety is an employer’s responsibility. Proper engineering, competent supervision and safe construction methods are fundamental duties. Workers must have the right to question dangerous decisions, raise concerns and stop unsafe work without intimidation.
Every time our delegates challenge a hazard, every time our health and safety representatives demand protection, we honour the workers of West Gate.
We remember the lives stolen, the families shattered and the survivors forever changed.
And we renew our promise: to stand together, demand accountability and fight for every worker’s right to return home safely.
Thirty-five lives. Never forgotten.
The West Gate Bridge in Melbourne collapsed on 15 October 1970, killing 35 workers and injuring 18 others. A 112-metre span of the bridge collapsed falling 50 metres to the ground and into the Yarra river. Two halves of a steel span were being joined when engineers noticed a misalignment. Workers attempted to straighten the span, when the span destabilised stressing the structure. The span suddenly buckled and collapsed.
The Royal Commission of Inquiry found several causes. The steel box girder design lacked redundancy and was vulnerable to buckling. Engineers and site managers failed to recognise and properly address structural warnings. The use of ‘kentledge’ (iron or concrete slabs) and the removal of bolts weakened the structure further. There was a lack of understanding in Australia of structural behaviour, adding to the problem.
The main contractor was John Holland and Co, working under Freeman Fox & Partners (designers). Unions condemned both for engineering negligence and the lack of proper consultation with workers. Unions were highly critical of the engineering decisions, lack of safety protocols, and poor working conditions on the site.
The collapse was avoidable, directly caused by mismanagement, cost-cutting, and the disregard for safety. Pressure to keep construction on schedule was at the expense of workers’ safety. The disaster strengthened union campaigns across Australia to improve Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) laws, mandatory union representation on construction sites, and stronger legal accountability for companies and engineers.
Graham Holton
