The Guardian • Issue #2213

What China’s Global Initiatives offer the World

Guomao District, Beijing CBD.

Guomao District, Beijing CBD. Photo: Jens Schott Knudsen – flickr.com (CC BY-NC 2.0)

At a moment of war, debt, corporate power, and technological dependency, five Chinese proposals reopen a long-suppressed question: what institutions are needed to make peace, sovereignty, and development materially possible?

The fires of war burn from Palestine to Ukraine and from Sudan to Iran, demoralising billions of people around the world who suffer from the inferno and inflation. There seems to be no exit from these conflicts, no way to envisage how they will end.

The NATO powers delusionally seek the defeat of Russia, while the United States seeks to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. Neither of these outcomes is within the realm of possibility: Russia is a nuclear power capable of facing an existential threat, while Iran has demonstrated that it is capable of seriously harming US assets in the region. The white flag of surrender will not fly, but the aggressors are not willing to seriously come to the negotiating table.

Against this background, the Chinese government has proposed five initiatives:

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Through infrastructure, trade, and investment, the BRI aims to help build a ‘global community of shared future,’ a vision set out in the Chinese government’s 2023 white paper. Its two main components were first proposed a decade earlier: an economic belt across Central Asia, announced in Kazakhstan in 2013, and a maritime silk road, announced in Indonesia.

The Global Development Initiative

At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, amid the pandemic, President Xi Jinping suggested that a development plan – such as the UN’s 2030 Agenda – should be an organising purpose of international relations.

The Global Security Initiative

At the Boao Forum for Asia, in April 2022, Xi proposed a vision for countries to develop themselves without planning for permanent conflict and coercion. The principles guiding development must rest on respect for territorial integrity.

The Global Civilisation Initiative

Announced in 2023, the initiative affirms civilisational diversity and different paths to modernisation. This was a direct rejection of the assumption that development requires imitating foreign cultures and institutions.

The Global Governance Initiative

In 2025, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Tianjin, Xi brought institutional reform into sharper focus through five concepts: sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centred approach, and genuine results.

Taken together, these five initiatives are a formidable basis for a global conversation not only on peace but on its material foundation: development. Their promise must be judged by whether they help our societies create pathways to peace, build productive capacity, and exercise control over economic life. These initiatives attempt to restart a conversation that culminated with the 1974 adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

China’s proposals show that what we need is not piecemeal reform of this or that global institution, or a ceasefire in this or that conflict, but a general overhaul of multilateralism that ensures not only formal equality between states but an end to the profound inequality in economic power.

These five initiatives do not, by themselves, establish a new international economic order. Currently, the international economic regime is a collection of rules governing trade, investment, taxation, debt, and technology. These rules are developed to enforce corporate power rather than to encourage international democracy. They are shaped by transnational corporations (TNCs), which can overpower governments by moving investment, shifting profits, and playing jurisdictions against one another. What can these initiatives achieve if the actual rules of the game continue to put corporate profits above all else?

The five initiatives’ broad principles will need to be turned into a program of the Global South. This should include greater Southern influence in financial institutions, development finance suited to industrial transformation, and trade and investment rules that permit economic diversification. These principles open a conversation, but the task before the Global South is to give them institutional force. Here are five areas in which that program can take shape:

Taxation

A 2015 Oxford University working paper estimated that tax avoidance by TNCs could cost developing countries around $213 billion a year in the long run. This number was underestimated at that time and is surely much higher now. To deal with this problem, negotiations began in 2025 on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

It is only fair for countries to exchange information about TNCs, require public reporting by jurisdiction, prevent firms from winning concessions through threats of relocation, and cooperate to tax profits where real economic activity takes place.

Labour standards

States should agree on enforceable protections for trade unions, collective bargaining, workplace safety, and freedom from forced labour. They should share inspection evidence and give workers ways to pursue claims across borders. Lead firms must face defined responsibilities for abuses in supply chains. Regional agreements can reduce the incentive to compete for investment by suppressing wages and rights. The International Labour Organization’s declaration on multinational enterprises provides guidance; binding enforcement requires further legal commitments.

Corporate accountability

In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council established a working group to negotiate a legally binding instrument on business and human rights. More than a decade later, negotiations have produced successive drafts but no adopted treaty. A serious regime would reform investment agreements to protect legitimate public regulation and make corporate obligations enforceable. This should provide for investigation of corporate malfeasance, liability for companies whose conduct or failures contribute to harm, cooperation between judicial authorities, and enforceable remedies through a credible international legal system.

Technology access

The negotiations over the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex to the World Health Organisation Pandemic Agreement provide a concrete arena in which countries of the Global South can press for technology cooperation that builds their productive capacity. The talks concern access to vaccines, treatments, and tests. The agreement’s provisions on technology transfer offer a starting point, although their reliance on mutually agreed terms leaves too much dependent on the willingness of private rights holders.

Public funding and procurement should carry enforceable conditions to secure technology licences, share practical knowledge, train workers, and strengthen domestic research and suppliers. Southern countries can combine purchasing power and jointly fund research institutions, while retaining the right to use compulsory licensing where international rules permit.

Access to patents alone cannot create the capacity to manufacture: countries also need equipment, skilled workers, and the knowledge required to organise production. The task is to turn the agreement’s commitments into obligations with clear targets and deadlines, enabling countries to adapt, improve, and produce technologies themselves.

Debt and finance

The UN’s Sevilla Commitment provides an opening for countries of the Global South to organise collectively for a fairer sovereign debt regime, drawing on the longstanding work of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on debt restructuring. Its platform for borrowing countries should enable them to coordinate demands for transparent lending, timely restructuring, and binding rules that prevent private creditors from obstructing settlements.

The intergovernmental process envisaged by the commitment should become a route towards an enforceable multilateral framework that protects essential public spending and judges repayment capacity alongside the investment needed for economic transformation.

Tricontinental Institute
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